Damasio “Descartes’ Error” Ch 1-4

I was truly impressed by the distinction between functioning “intellect” (and other sensory/cognitive functions) and impaired “emotion/feeling & rational decision making” that Damasio’s work produced. I can’t really quote an exact page number because the entire 4 chapters built and espoused this newly-discovered revelation.  People can be intellectually sound (like Elliot, from chapter 3, who passed all of the psych tests with flying colors), and still “catatonically indecisive” (in the case of the near comatose woman who recovered in chapter 4) or incapable of “reach[ing] decisions… [and] mak[ing] an effective plan” as we saw with all of the case studies. (Damasio 37).  It echoes the interconnectedness of rational decision making and emotion that we’ve been dealing with all semester.  It goes further, even, providing a tangible, empirical basis for this connection.

Also, I found one line telling (especially for us Rhetoric majors): “Nor will I deny that seemingly normal reason can be disturbed by subtle biases rooted in emotion.  For instance, a patient is more likely to prefer a treatment if told that 90 percent of those treated are alive five years later, than if told that 10 percent are dead.” (Damasio 52). (Here, Damasio is actually talking about the support for the common notion that “emotion can be a major source of irrational behavior.” (52).)

We’re probably all cognizant of the reasons behind this. In the former case, the focus is upon life, and it is stressed that the treatment preserves life 90% of the time. In considerably dire circumstances, this would certainly seem appealing.  The hope of preservation of life is what drives the reasoning, which in turn elects the treatment. In the latter case, the focus is upon death, and it is stressed that the treatment causes death 10% of the time. In considerably dire circumstances, this should still seem appealing (from a strictly rational standpoint).  But, as Damasio notes (and our intuition echoes), it’s not. The fear of death *intersects* with the reasoning, guiding the patient to opt out.  Fear can be a much stronger motivator than hope.

The way a question is framed has a huge impact on how it is answered.  This is seemingly why our legal system lets attorneys ask leading questions during cross-examination (when the witness is presumably hostile) but not while questioning their own witnesses (who are likely to have a bias toward answering the way the attorney wants anyways).  The use of the “leading question”, with its inherent bias, may only be used to mitigate another bias (hostile cross-examination), not to exacerbate one.  Damasio’s work seems to retroactively justify this convention, and reveal that it really serves equitable justice, as opposed to being another arbitrary rule handed down from days of old.  

Outside of the legal realm, framing is still at work.  The psychology students among us are no-doubt aware of the “framing effect”, and its interplay with gains/losses and risk aversion.  We are all so incredibly manipulate-able, via our emotions, that we are likely to choose almost any option if it’s presented to us the right way.  This is perhaps good news if you’re the orator; Its also a strong caution to the recipient of the persuasive speech.  Damasio suggested that knowledge of Elliot’s compromised free will (38) justified him receiving disability benefits. It wasn’t that he was lazy; he was categorically incapable of electing a sound plan and following through with it.  If we’re really this susceptible to the way things are framed to us, how much free will does the “normal” (Non frontal-lobe-damaged) mind have?